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We seem to live in an incredibly credulous age. Despite the unparal-
leled proliferation of information (or perhaps because of it), many people
appear to believe in all sorts of myths or false narratives that exaggerate,
idealize, or misconstrue reality. These beliefs extend to almost all aspects
of modern life, from pseudoscience (Swami, Stieger, Pietschnig et al.,
2012b) to pseudohistory (Allchin, 2004), as well as they way societies
are governed and the motives of those who govern. In addition, many
millions of people worldwide appear to subscribe to unfounded “conspir-
acy theories,” while denying “official” or mainstream accounts of many
important phenomena.
Whether it was about Salem witches, slaveholders, Jews, Bolsheviks,
or black militants, conspiracy theories have always found deep roots in
society (Fenster, 1999; Goldberg, 2001; Knight, 2001). In contemporary
societies, however, conspiracy theorists have found fertile ground in intel-
ligence failures, such as in the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941
(Barkun, 2003; Prange, 1986) and the assassination of President John F.
Kennedy in 1963. In terms of the latter, for example, many Americans
remain skeptical of the findings of theWarrenCommission Report, which
identified Lee Harvey Oswald as having acted alone in assassinating John
F. Kennedy (Posner, 1993). Indeed, by the early 1990s, polls suggested
that over 70% of Americans believed that some form of conspiracy was
responsible for the president’s death (Goertzel, 1994; McHoskey, 1995;
Southwell and Twist, 2004).
The proliferation of conspiracy theories appears to have gathered pace
in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, as conspir-
acy theorists became convinced that they had uncovered hidden plots
behind the events. Many scholars have noted with some concern the
spread of conspiracy theories about the event (e.g., Goldberg, 2004)
and the large number of respondents who disbelieve many aspects of
mainstream accounts of the attacks (Hargrove and Stempel, 2006). Sim-
ilarly, in the aftermath of the bombings in London on July 7, 2005,
many disbelieved mainstream/official accounts that the attacks had been
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carried out by four Muslim men (Soni, 2007). However, it would be
wrong to think that conspiracy theories are a uniquely Western phe-
nomenon; rather, conspiracy theories appear to exist in many cultures
worldwide (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2004; Groh, 1987; Zonis and Joseph,
1994).
In an increasingly globalized world, and against the background of tur-
moil caused by financial crises, war, and international terrorism, the need
to understand the nature and roots of conspiracy theories has become
increasingly important (Goldberg, 2001, 2004). In this chapter, we begin
by providing a working definition of conspiracy theories in the modern
age. We then dissect the roots of conspiracy theories, focusing in partic-
ular on early sociological work and more recent psychological research.
Finally, we briefly evaluate the place of conspiracy theories in modern
societies and ask whether they can ever be a force for positive change. In
so doing, we pay particular attention to political conspiracy theories in
modern times.
What Makes a Theory Conspiracist?
In reviewing the literature on conspiracy theories, various authors have
expressed their surprise at the relative dearth of empirical work in the
area (e.g., Swami and Coles, 2010). One reason why conspiracy theories
may not have attracted much scholarly attention is the lack of consen-
sus as to what is, and is not, a conspiracy theory. This concern might
seem innocuous enough until one is faced with distinguishing between
conspiracy theories and conspiratorial politics, or real clandestine and
covert political activities (Bale, 2007; see also Lidz, 1978). A clear and
consistent definition of conspiracy theory, placed on a sound theoretical
and empirical base, is required before the study of such beliefs could
progress. Unfortunately, there was – and there still is – a good deal of
conceptual confusion as to what makes a belief conspiracist in nature,
with scholars often relying on informal or imprecise working definitions
(Swami and Coles, 2010).
Traditionally, many scholars have relied on Hofstadter’s (1966, pp. 14,
29) definition, first provided in his seminal work The Paranoid Style in
American Politics and Other Essays, of a conspiracy theory as any belief
in the existence of a “vast, insidious, preternaturally effective interna-
tional conspiratorial network designed to perpetrate acts of the most
fiendish character” and that aims to “undermine and destroy a way of
life.” Implicit in this definition of a conspiracy theory is the notion that
some event or practice can be explained with “reference to the machina-
tions of powerful people, who attempt to conceal their role (at least until
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their aims are accomplished” (Sunstein andVermeule, 2009, p. 205). In
very general terms, then, conspiracy theories are a subset of false beliefs
in which the ultimate cause of an event is believed to be due to a plot by
multiple actors working together with a clear goal in mind, often unlaw-
fully and in secret (Barkun, 2003; Basham, 2001; Davis, 1971; Goldberg,
2001; Zonis and Joseph, 1994).
For practical reasons, however, some authors have limited their focus
to those beliefs that are potentially harmful in some way (excluding, say,
the belief that Santa Claus distributes presents on Christmas Eve) and
those that are unjustified based on information that is available in the
public domain (Sunstein and Vermeule, 2009). In addition, Bale (2007,
pp. 51–3) has suggested a set of four key characteristics that distinguish
conspiracy theorists from real conspiratorial politics. These are that:
(1) Conspiracy theorists “consider the alleged conspirators to be Evil
Incarnate.” That is, the conspirators are not simply actors with dif-
fering political points-of-view, but are rather “inhuman, superhuman,
and/or anti-human beings who regularly commit abominable acts and
are implacably attempting to subvert and destroy everything that is
decent and worth preserving in the existing world.”
(2) Conspiracy theorists “perceive the conspiratorial group as both
monolithic and unerring in the pursuit of its goals.” In other words,
conspiracy theorists believe that there is a single conspiratorial hub,
which plans and coordinates its activities, and which possesses a high
degree of internal solidarity, cohesiveness, and single-mindedness.
(3) Conspiracy theorists “believe that the conspiratorial group is omni-
present.” That is, most conspiracy theories postulate the existence
of a group of conspirators that is “international in its spatial dimen-
sions and continuous in its temporal dimensions.” In this view, the
conspiratorial group is believed to be capable of operating anywhere,
which in turn allows for any negative outcome even remotely asso-
ciated with the aims of the conspiratorial group to be attributed to
them.
(4) Conspiracy theorists believe that the conspiratorial group is “virtually
omnipotent.” In short, the conspiratorial group is considered to have
been the force behind events of historical importance and continues
to use nefarious and subversive means to maintain their domination
over society. The one means of subverting their influence is to heed
the warning of conspiracy theorists, although that is by no means a
guarantee of success.
The above definitional criteria are not meant to be exhaustive (see
Mandick, 2007), but they do capture the essence of most prominent
conspiracy theories, such as the belief that the US Central Intelligence
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Agency (CIA) was responsible for the assassination of John F. Kennedy
or that the September 11, 2001 attacks were perpetrated (or allowed to
happen) by high-ranking officials in the US government. More perti-
nently, perhaps, it is these definitional criteria that serve to distinguish
conspiracy theories from real, everyday conspiratorial politics that are
carried out by groups both within and outside government. In short,
then, a conspiracy theory can be defined operationally as a set of false
beliefs in which an omnipresent and omnipotent group of actors are
believed to work together in pursuit of malevolent goals (Barkun, 2003;
Basham, 2001; Davis, 1971; Goldberg, 2001; Zonis and Joseph, 1994).
Having established a working definition of a conspiracy theory, we now
turn to the sociology of conspiracy theories, examining in particular their
emergence and purpose.
The Paranoid Style
Without doubt, contemporary discussions of conspiracy theories owe
much to Hofstadter’s paper“The Paranoid Style in American Politics”
(1966), in which he sought to contextualize the ascendancy of right-wing
conspiracy theories. In coining the term “paranoid style,” Hofstadter
clarified that he was borrowing a clinical term to describe a political
personality:
American politics has often been an area for angry minds. In recent years, we have
seen angry minds at work, mainly among extreme right-wingers, who have now
demonstrated . . . how much political leverage can be got out of the animosities
and passions of a small minority. But, behind this, I believe, there is a style of
mind that is far from new, and that is not necessarily right-wing. I call it the
paranoid style, simply because no other word adequately evokes the sense of
heated exaggeration, suspiciousness, and conspiratorial fantasy that I have in
mind. (p. 3)
In short, the paranoid style was a result of “angry minds” that viewed
conspiratorial agents as “a perfect model of malice, a kind of amoral
superman – sinister, ubiquitous, powerful, cruel, sexual, luxury-loving.”
For the conspiracist:
[T]he enemy is not caught in the toils of the vast mechanism of history, himself a
victim of his past, his desires, his limitations. He wills, indeed, he manufactures,
the mechanism of history, or tries to deflect the normal course of history in an
evil way. He makes crises, starts runs on banks, causes depressions, manufactures
disasters, and then enjoys and profits from the misery he has produced. The
paranoid’s interpretation of history is distinctly personal: decisive events are not
taken as part of the stream of history, but as the consequences of someone’s
will. (p. 22)
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What’s more, because conspiracy theorists traffic “in the birth and death
of whole worlds, whole political orders, whole systems of human val-
ues,” they do not see “social conflict as something to be mediated and
compromised, in the manner of the working politician.” Rather:
Since what is at stake is always a conflict between absolute good and absolute evil,
what is necessary is not compromise but the will to fight things out to a finish.
Since the enemy is thought of as being totally evil and totally unappeasable, he
must be totally eliminated – if not from the world, at least from the theatre of
operations to which the paranoid directs his attention. (p. 24)
This extended description of Hofstadter’s work is necessary because it
set the tone for much of the sociological literature that followed. Deeply
influenced by Hofstadter, many scholars came to view conspiracy the-
orists as both paranoid and delusional. In fact, a good deal of research
focused heavily on the psychopathology of conspiracy theorists, variously
proposing that conspiracist ideation was the product of extreme paranoia,
delusional thinking, or narcissism (see Robins and Post, 1997). In turn,
the delusional nature of conspiracist ideation was assumed to result in
an inability to effectively shape social and political action. In short, the
influence of Hofstadter is evident in attempts to explain the acceptance
of conspiracy theories in terms of individual (Robins and Post, 1997) or
collective pathology (Groh, 1987).
Although it is quite possible that some conspiracist ideation is the result
of mental illness (Wulff, 1987; see also Liu, 1998), most contemporary
scholars believe that the lens of psychopathology is not particularly help-
ful in understanding the reasons why conspiracy theories arise. A com-
mon critique is that conspiracy theories are so widespread, not just within
but also across cultures, that it implausible to suggest that so many mem-
bers of society are mentally ill (Sunstein and Vermeule, 2009). Rather,
more recent sociological research has sought to understand conspiracy
theories as a means for members of society to explain social phenomena
that are otherwise difficult to comprehend (Waters, 1997).
In actual fact, this perspective also owes much to Hofstadter, who
posited that conspiracy theories are more likely to emerge among
individuals or groups who feel powerless, disadvantaged, or voiceless
(Hofstadter, 1971). In particular, it is thought that conspiracy theo-
ries help to make sense of phenomena that are complex, incompre-
hensible, or beyond one’s control. By reducing and simplifying phe-
nomena that are often unimaginable, such as terrorist attacks or great
tragedy, and by tying together a series of events in relation to its pur-
ported causes and effects (Parish and Parker, 2001), conspiracy theories
seemingly offer coherent explanations for human affairs that are not
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otherwise forthcoming (McCauley and Jacques, 1979; Miller, 2002;
Pipes, 1997).
Thus, conspiracy theories purport to identify the cause of a perceived
injustice or tragedy, and thereby help individuals to make sense of the
world. Moreover, in personifying that source, conspiracy theories help
to reaffirm an individual’s ability to shape historical events and, partially
at least, offer a way to assuage feelings of powerlessness (Pratt, 2003).
Certainly, there is evidence from particular populations, such as African-
Americans, to suggest that conspiracist beliefs arise as a means of making
sense of an individual’s marginalized position in society (Thorburn and
Bogart, 2005). Moreover, when participants are experimentally made to
feel that they have a lack of control, their belief in conspiracy increases
(Sullivan, Landau, and Rothschild, 2010; Whitson and Galinsky, 2008).
From this perspective, conspiracy theories are viewed as rationale psy-
chological phenomena that are no different from other religious, social,
or political beliefs. Like these other meta-explanatory frameworks, a con-
spiracy theory helps to fill a need for certainty, control, or understanding,
filling gaps in knowledge and offering a coherent elucidation of difficult
events (Leman, 2007; Whitson and Galinsky, 2008). As such, conspiracy
theories are believed to gain acceptance particularly when mainstream
explanations of an event contain erroneous information, discrepancies,
or ambiguities (Miller, 2002). For individuals who feel powerless, a con-
spiracy theory helps explain those ambiguities and “provides a convenient
alternative to living with uncertainty” (Zarefsky, 1984, p. 72).
Consistent with this view, some scholars have suggested that conspir-
acy theories fulfill an important functional role, particularly when sources
of information are limited. Given that individuals often have to rely on
others for direct or personal information, it is not surprising that they
often suffer from what Hardin (2002) has called a “crippled epistemol-
ogy.” Hardin uses this perspective to understand extremist behavior.
Extremism, he argues, sometimes stems from the fact that individuals
have very little accurate or relevant information, and the little informa-
tion that they do have is supported by their extremist views. In support
of this view, recent evidence has suggested that the type of information
that individuals receive about a given event can influence their conspir-
acist ideation (Swami et al., 2012b). Specifically, where information is
uncritical of a conspiracy theory, acceptance appears to be higher than if
the information is critical.
Sunstein and Vermeule (2009) have applied a similar framework to
conspiracy theories: rather than being the product of irrationality or men-
tal illness, these authors view conspiracy theories as a rational and logi-
cal manner of responding to the little information that individuals have
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about a particular phenomenon. Particularly when there is little reliable
information about an event or when details are ambiguous, conspiracy
theories may gain acceptance precisely because they offer a coherent and
comprehensive worldview. From the point of view of conspiracy theo-
rists, their beliefs are justified in the light of the information that they
have available to them, even if those beliefs seem perplexing in relation
to knowledge available in wider society (Sunstein and Vermeule, 2009).
Other scholars have built on the notion of powerlessness to explain why
conspiracy theories become accepted among some individuals and have
posited that conspiracy ideation stems from an inability to attain certain
goals (Edelman, 1985; Ingelhart, 1987) or as ameans of maintaining self-
esteem in the face of external threats (Robins and Post, 1997), coping
with persecution (Combs, Penn, and Fenigstein, 2002), reasserting indi-
vidualism (Davis, 1969; Melley, 2000), or expressing negative feelings
towards out-groups (Ungerleider and Wellisch, 1979). Although these
different explanations may seem diverse, they share a common assump-
tion that conspiracy theories are not a result of psychopathological minds,
but rather a rational attempt to deal with feelings of powerlessness sparked
by complex economic, social, and political phenomena.
Psychological Perspectives
In contrast to the above sociological perspectives on conspiracy theo-
ries, psychological examinations of the phenomenon have stemmed from
cognitive science and, more recently, differential psychology. In terms
of the former, one school of thought believes that conspiracy theories
emerge, in part at least, as a function of the fundamental attribution
error (Clarke, 2002). This bias refers to the general tendency to over-
value dispositional or personality-based explanations for observed events
or the behavior of others, while undervaluing situational explanations for
the self (Ross, 1977). Applied to conspiracist ideation, Clarke (2002)
argues that conspiracy theorists may be more likely to blame person-
ified actors or conspiratorial networks, thereby making a dispositional
inference even when adequate situational explanations are available. It is
because of this cognitive bias that conspiracy theorists rely on conspira-
torial explanations for events and why they maintain those beliefs even
in the face of alternative, more plausible explanations.
Other work has sought to understand conspiracy theories in the con-
text of biased assimilation and attitude polarization (McHoskey, 1995).
Specifically, when an event is highly salient or becomes “cognitively
available” (Sunstein and Vermeule, 2009), competing actors will seek
to explain the same event from different points of view. When opposing
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sides are presented with the same evidence, there may be a tendency to
uncritically accept evidence that is supportive of one’s own argument,
while seeking to discredit contrary evidence (McHoskey, 1995). Corrob-
orative evidence is provided in a study by Leman and Cinnirella (2007),
which found that conspiracy theorists judged a fictitious account of an
assassination as more plausible if it was consistent with their beliefs. For
conspiracy theorists in particular, conspiracy theories may serve not only
to explain the event in question but also to symbolize broader narra-
tives about human affairs while casting doubt on alternative viewpoints
(Sunstein and Vermeule, 2009).
However,McHoskey (1995) also reported that, when participants were
presented with mixed evidence, there were signs of attitude polarization,
in which individuals endorsed a more extreme position in line with their
tendency. Consistent with this viewpoint, Sunstein and Vermeule (2009)
argued that group polarization may be an important driver of conspir-
acist ideation. Within groups with some initial inclination, the views of
others in the group may come to be skewed in the direction of more
extreme positions in favor of the initial tendency. However, Sunstein and
Vermeule (2009) also note that group polarization is more likely when
individuals in a group have a shared sense of identity; this allows con-
trasting viewpoints to be dismissed more easily by the group as lacking
in credibility. Conformity biases may also play a role in group polariza-
tion, with individuals professing agreement with conspiracist ideas, or
suppressing dissent, in order to avoid group sanctions.
Sunstein and Vermeule (2009) have also discussed the role of the emo-
tional content of conspiracy theories in their dissemination and accep-
tance. Much in the same way that “urban legends” are constructed to
trigger strong emotional responses, conspiracy theories are often similarly
loaded with intense emotions. By triggering a strong emotional response,
conspiracy theories serve to focus attention on biased information and
are thereby more easily spread to others who share similar beliefs. In
addition, acceptance of emotionally loaded conspiracy theories may help
to justify affective states produced by an event. There is some empirical
evidence to support such an argument: one study reported that expo-
sure to Oliver Stone’s 1991 film JFK, in which it was alleged that the
assassination of John F. Kennedy was a government conspiracy, signifi-
cantly aroused anger in participants and changed beliefs towards greater
acceptance of the conspiracy theory (Butler, Coopman, and Zimbardo,
1995).
Other relevant work has examined conspiracy theories in relation to the
third-person effect – that is, a tendency for people to believe that persua-
sive media has a larger influence on others than themselves. For example,
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Douglas and Sutton (2008) had participants read material containing
conspiracy theories about Princess Diana’s death before rating their own
and others’ agreement with the statements, as well as their perceived ret-
rospective attitudes. These authors found that participants significantly
underestimated how much the conspiracy theories influenced their own
attitudes. A smaller body of theorizing has looked at the role of rumors
and speculation in the assimilation of conspiracy theories, although this
work remains piecemeal (Sunstein and Vermeule, 2009).
Personality and Individual Differences
Most recently, a small body of research has examined conspiracy theories
from the point of view of differential psychology.Much of this work can be
traced back to Goertzel’s (1994) seminal paper, in which he argued that
conspiracy theories form part of a “monological belief system.” That is,
once an individual has adopted a conspiracist worldview, new conspiracy
theories are assimilated more easily because they support that particular
worldview. Thus, believing (for example) that the September 11, 2001,
attacks were committed by the US government makes it more likely that
an individual will accept the conspiracy theory that the 2005 London
bombing were committed by the British government.
There is accumulating evidence in support of the idea that conspiracy
theories form part of a monological belief system (e.g., Wood, Dou-
glas, and Sutton, in press). One study reported that individuals who
more strongly believed in a range of conspiracy theories, such as the
idea that John F. Kennedy was not assassinated by Lee Harvey Oswald,
were also more likely to endorse conspiracy theories about the September
11, 2001, attacks (Swami, Chamorro-Premuzic, and Furnham, 2010).
A second study similarly reported that stronger belief in conspiracy theo-
ries was associated with a greater tendency to endorse conspiracy theories
about the July 7, 2005 bombings in London (Swami et al., 2011). More
interestingly, perhaps, the same study also showed that individuals who
more strongly believed in conspiracy theories were also more likely to
endorse an entirely fictional conspiracy theory devised by the experi-
menters (Swami et al., 2011).
Other related work has examined associations between belief in con-
spiracy theories and individual difference traits that were identified by
earlier sociological work. Thus, studies have reported significant associa-
tions between stronger conspiracist ideation and higher anomie, distrust
in authority, political cynicism, and powerlessness, as well as lower self-
esteem (Abalakina-Paap, Stephan, Craig et al., 1994; Goertzel, 1994;
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Swami et al., 2010, 2011; Swami and Furnham, 2012). In general, these
findings are consistent with the proposal that conspiracist ideation ismore
common among disenfranchised, disadvantaged, or powerless groups
(Hofstadter, 1966) and that conspiracy theories play a role in self-esteem
maintenance (Robins and Post, 1997; Young, 1990).
In addition, two studies have reported significant associations between
stronger conspiracist belief and greater support for democratic princi-
ples (Swami et al., 2010, 2011), which might reflect conspiracy theorists’
greater tendency to question official modes of governance. In addition,
studies have also reported significant associations between greater con-
spiracist ideation and higher authoritarianism (Abalakina-Paap et al.,
1994; McHoskey, 1995), which has been explained as a manifestation
of the tendency of conspiracy theorists to direct blame towards out-
groups (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1994). Furthermore, at least one study
has reported a significant association between conspiracist ideation and
lower crystallized intelligence (Swami et al., 2011), which might sug-
gest that the simplified explanations of complex phenomena offered by
conspiracy theories may be more appealing to individuals with lower
cognitive ability.
Several studies have also specifically examined the associations between
conspiracist ideation and the Big Five personality variables (Swami et al.,
2010, 2011). These studies have reported a significant negative associa-
tion between conspiracist ideation and the Big Five factor of agreeable-
ness (which reflects a tendency to be pleasant and accommodating in
social situations), which was explained as a function of more disagree-
able individuals being more suspicious and antagonistic towards others
(Swami et al., 2010). In addition, there also appears to be a reliable asso-
ciation between conspiracist ideation and higher openness to experience
scores (which reflects a preference for intellectual variety and stimula-
tion). Swami et al. (2010) have suggested that more open individuals
may show a greater appreciation for unique, unusual, or challenging
ideas, or that their proclivity for new ideas may result in greater exposure
to conspiracist ideas. However, it is important to note that the significant
associations between conspiracist ideation and the Big Five variables that
have been uncovered to date have generally been small (r  .15).
A smaller body of work has also examined the associations between
conspiracist ideation and psychopathological individual difference traits.
For example, Swami et al. (2011) reported significant associations
between conspiracist ideation and paranormal beliefs, though not super-
stitious beliefs. Conversely, however, another study using confirmatory
analysis showed that belief in conspiracy theories was associated with
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schizotypy and paranoid ideation, but not paranormal beliefs (Darwin,
Neave, and Holmes, 2011). Other related work has suggested that belief
in conspiracy theories is associated with attempts to cope with existen-
tial threat and death-related anxiety (Newheiser, Farias, and Tausch,
2011). Such findings, when taken together, suggest that conspiracy the-
ories may afford individuals a means of maintaining meaning or control
in their lives.
What Is to Be Done?
An important conclusion that can be derived from the above review of
the literature is that conspiracy theories, far from being irrational or a
sign of a pathological mind, in fact provide deep insights into the func-
tioning of society. In this sense, it is important to acknowledge the roles
that conspiracy theories play for those who disseminate and accept them,
particularly in terms of empowerment in times of crisis and tragedy
(Swami and Coles, 2010; Waters, 1997). Taken to its logical conclu-
sion, it might be argued that conspiracy theories are a powerful indicator
of dissatisfaction with aspects of governance, society, or politics. Only
by understanding the roots of conspiracist ideation and its function in
society can scholars and practitioners truly begin to address the more dif-
ficult problem of challenging false, unjustified, and harmful conspiracist
ideation (Sunstein and Vermeule, 2009).
Even so, when it comes to the question of dealing with conspiracy
theories, scholarly opinion appears to be mixed. On the one hand, some
scholars have suggested that conspiracy theories have a beneficial role to
play for societies (Clarke, 2002). For example, insofar as conspiracy the-
ories reveal anomalies, inconsistencies, or ambiguities in official accounts
of important events, they may sometimes reveal real conspiracies (e.g.,
the Watergate Hotel room used by the Democratic National Committee
was indeed bugged by Republican officials, with instructions from the
White House). In addition, to the extent that conspiracy theorists press
governments for better explanations of an event, it can lead to better
demands for, as well as actually improved, transparency in government
affairs (Clarke, 2002; Leman, 2007; Swami and Coles, 2010).
Other scholars have offered similar arguments. Miller (2002) suggests
that, in some instances, the means of addressing the credibility of gov-
ernance are severely limited. In such scenarios, conspiracy theories may
provide individuals with a public opportunity to challenge aspects of gov-
ernance that may be otherwise circumscribed. Similarly, Fenster (1999)
views conspiracy theories as populist narrative that pit “the people” in
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opposition to “the power bloc” and afford space for the former to ques-
tion and theorize on the distribution of power in contemporary societies.
As Fenster (1999, p. 109) writes, conspiracy theories “must be recog-
nized as a cultural practice that attempts to map, in narrative form, the
trajectories and effects of power.”
Moreover, far from promoting social withdrawal or political inac-
tion, conspiracy theories may foster and promote political mobilization
(Saucier, Akers, Shen-Miller et al., 2009). Fenster (1999) believes that
the narratives of conspiracy theories contain the beginnings of social
movements that can be a force for positive change. In a similar vein,
Waters (1997, p. 123) argues that, insofar as conspiracy theories help
explain misfortunes by attributing them to the planned actions of oth-
ers, they should be seen “as the ultimate recognition of agency in social
action.” Others have noted the power of conspiracy theories to foster sol-
idarity among previously disparate groups and to provide new forms of
authority in spaces that have been vacated by faith in traditional author-
ities (Goldberg, 2001; Sasson, 1995).
However, other scholars, as well as some of those cited above, have
noted the very real limitations of conspiracy theories as a force for change.
For example, Goldberg (2001) acknowledges that conspiracy theories
can be empowering in times of crisis and tragedy, such as a terrorist
attack or a financial crisis, but also argues that they actively erode faith in
governance. By continually questioning authority and by closing the door
to compromise, conspiracy theorists weaken the ability of governments
to govern. Similarly, some scholars have noted that the simplistic nature
of many conspiracy theories means that they often easily succumb to
exclusionary narratives (Basham, 2003). In such cases, conspiracy the-
ories not only lose any power to constructively change society, but also
harm society with negative messages (Fenster, 1999; Miller, 2002). In
short, conspiracy theories often have the potential to sow discord, and,
worse still, when actors (whether conspiracy theorists or their detractors)
move on unfounded beliefs, it can result in mistrust and violence.
Other scholars have likewise noted the many negative practical out-
comes of subscribing to conspiracy theories, particularly among select
populations. For example, several research groups have focused on the
conspiracy theories held by some individuals that HIV/AIDS and birth
control are plots against African-Americans (Bird and Bogart, 2003,
2005; Parsons, Simmons, Shinhoster et al., 1999; Thorburn and Bogart,
2005; Turner and Darity, 1973). Regardless of whether or not such
conspiracy theories are justified (consider, for example, the previous
unethical research involving African-Americans, such as the Tuskegee
syphilis study; Thomas and Quinn, 1991), it has been shown that belief
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in such conspiracy theories is associated with less consistent pregnancy
prevention and condom use and poorer knowledge about HIV/AIDS and
AIDS-prevention programs (Bogart and Thorburn, 2006).
Finally, it is important to question the potential of conspiracy theories
as a force for change in itself. Fenster (1999, p. 109) is perhaps most
vocal in this respect, arguing that conspiracy theories frequently “leave
unsettled the resolution to the question of power that [they] attempt
to address.” Although a degree of skepticism is vital for the healthy
functioning of societies, conspiracy theorists typically question structures
of power without offering a real alternative to those structures. That is,
by blaming conspiratorial agents, conspiracy theories in fact help those
who seek to absolve modes of governance from blame in perpetuating
and accentuating injustice. Moreover, because many conspiracy theorists
deny the legitimacy of authority, they become trapped in exclusionary
politics that, over time, becomes both polarized and polarizing. To the
extent that conspiracy theories are unjustified or baseless, they may also
divert attention from real political issues, undermine democratic debate,
and weaken associated movements for change.
Given such negative aspects, scholars are now paying greater atten-
tion to the eradication of conspiracy theories. Not surprisingly, conspir-
acy theories have been found to be very difficult to eliminate, precisely
because of their nature (Keeley, 1999; see also Kramer, 1994). For exam-
ple, to the extent that conspiracy theorists segregate themselves both
informationally and physically, and to the extent that they are already
distrustful of authority, it becomes much harder to engage with conspir-
acy theorists and to challenge their claims. Even where dialogue has been
established, the fact that many conspiracy theorists “consider the alleged
conspirators to be Evil Incarnate” (Bale, 2007, p. 51) means that the
potential for compromise is severely stunted.
Nevertheless, Sunstein and Vermeule (2009, p. 218) have proposed
that, when dealing with conspiracy theories, governments have a number
of options at their disposal:
(1) Ban conspiracy theories outright.
(2) Impose a tax (financial or otherwise) on those who disseminate con-
spiracy theories.
(3) Engage in “counterspeech,” where justified and sound arguments
are used to discredit conspiracy theories.
(4) Formally hire private parties to engage in counterspeech.
(5) Engage in informal communication with conspiracy theorists, en-
couraging them to help.
However, the utility of these suggested actions is unknown: banning
conspiracy theories or taxing those who disseminate conspiracy theories
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may not only prove difficult to implement (e.g., from a legal point of view)
but may also serve to enhance the appeal of conspiracy theories. On the
other hand, Sunstein andVermeule’s (2009) suggestion that governments
actively try to break up extremist groups that supply conspiracy theories
by “cognitively infiltrating” those groups through methods (3), (4), and
(5) above may be easier to implement. More specifically, “government
agents and their allies (acting either virtually or in real space, either openly
or anonymously) will undermine the crippled epistemology of believers
by planting doubts about the theories and stylized facts that circulate
within such groups, thereby introducing beneficial cognitive diversity”
(Sunstein and Vermeule, 2009, p. 219).
Implicit in this latter strategy is the assumption that conspiracy theories
reflect uncritical acceptance of knowledge and that the provision of more
accurate information may counter the crippled epistemology that char-
acterizes many conspiracy theorists. To date, however, it remains unclear
whether belief in conspiracy theories diminishes in the face of counter-
evidence (e.g., Cook, 2003, who argues that the conspiracist mind will
not accept normal modes of evidence). Newheiser et al. (2011) have
provided some evidence that counter-evidence may be useful in reducing
conspiracist ideation, although the effects may be stronger for individuals
who already endorse a competing belief system, such as religion. More-
over, it seems likely that conspiracy theorists would not openly invite
“cognitive infiltration” and may view such attempts, if uncovered, as fur-
ther evidence as a conspiratorial plot. The strategy outlined by Sunstein
and Vermeule (2009) further assumes the existence of a well-meaning
government, acting in the best interests of its citizenry, which may or
may not be the case.
Others begin from a different starting point. Goldberg (2004, pp. 259–
60), for example, sees conspiracy theories as reflecting diminished faith
in governance; in turn, if conspiracy theories are to be tackled, then it will
require governments that are transparent, open, and truly democratic:
While candour and openness deter rumour and allegation, an unthinking and
imperious practice of secrecy instinctively raises suspicion. Overreaction, official
deception, and explanations that intentionally obscure provide opportunities for
the conspiracy theorists. They thrive on public disillusionment and the loss of
faith in national leaders and institutions. In such an atmosphere, intelligence
failure readily mutates into conspiracy.
In Goldberg’s view, it is important to begin by understanding what con-
spiracies say about the problems of governance so that those issues can
be adequately and appropriately addressed. By targeting intelligence fail-
ures and by assessing aspects of governance that could be improved,
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Goldberg suggests that belief in conspiracy theories should begin to
diminish.
Others have applied a similar perspective in suggesting that conspiracy
theories can begin to be tackled by addressing the causes of popular dis-
content. Swami and Coles (2010), for example, have suggested that the
high prevalence, among BritishMuslims, of conspiracy theories about the
London bombings of July 7, 2005 reflects, in part at least, the alienation
of British Muslims from mainstream politics and governance. The solu-
tion, then, is not to further marginalize such groups, but rather to open
up spaces for dialogue and to allow all citizens to actively play a role in
governance. Indeed, there is evidence among African-American samples
to suggest that belief in conspiracy theories is lower among individuals
who believe they can influence the political process (Parsons et al., 1999).
In short, then, until such time as marginalized groups are allowed to par-
ticipate in, and actively shape, governance, belief in conspiracy theories
may remain high among some sections of society.
What, then, is to be done? Extending Goldberg’s (2001, 2004) line of
reasoning, we contend that blaming (whether implicitly or explicitly) con-
spiracy theorists for failing to participate on equal grounds with authority
may prove fruitless. Rather, a more promising strategy would be to ensure
that all forms of governance are transparent, open, and democratic to the
fullest extent. In this view, conspiracy theorists are neither privy to any
hidden truths nor psychopathological in their beliefs. Rather, conspiracy
theories are extensions of the dissatisfaction and disaffection with modes
of governance in many societies. That is, conspiracy theorists should be
seen as desperately attempting to make accountable those governments
that they believe, often with some justification, to have taken part in some
form of deception. By extension, only real democratic change would set
in place the foundations for a society in which harmful and unjustified
conspiracy theories are weakened and ultimately extinguished.
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